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Abstract. Virtualization technologies allow multiple tenants to share physical 
resources with a degree of security and isolation that cannot be guaranteed by 
mere containerization. Further, virtualization allows protected transparent intro- 
spection of Virtual Machine activity and content, thus supporting additional con- 
trol and monitoring. These features provide an explanation, although partial, of 
why virtualization has been an enabler for the flourishing of cloud services. Nev- 
ertheless, security and privacy issues are still present in virtualization technol- 
ogy and hence in Cloud platforms. As an example, even hardware virtualization 
protection/isolation is far from being perfect and uncircumventable, as recently 
discovered vulnerabilities show. The objective of this paper is to shed light on cur- 
rent virtualization technology and its evolution from the point of view of security, 
having as an objective its applications to the Cloud setting. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The advances in virtualization technology of the past decade have rendered the Cloud 
approach feasible and convenient. Nevertheless, the main limitation of virtual machines 
is that they were born as a means to easily migrate from physically deployed services 
to more compact and manageable images. In fact, each and every VM runs its own full 
operating system together with the various libraries required by the application (see 
Fig. 1) [36]. Such an approach multiplicates the usage of RAM, CPU, and storage with 
respect to simply hosting multiple services as separate processes on a single piece of 
bare metal. 
Containerization technology is intended to replace hypervisor and VMs, and de- 
ploys each application in its own process-like environment running on the physical 
machine on a single operating system [43]. Containers can be provisioned (and depro- 
visioned) in a few seconds and make a more efficient usage of resources, achieving a 
much higher application density (orders of magnitude [38]) than virtualization. This 
renders containers much more convenient than virtual machines. 
Nevertheless, as we will show along this paper, virtualization is not on a dead path. 
In fact, virtual machines provide additional security mechanisms and isolation benefits 
in many application scenarios that are often worth the additional resource usage [28, 
40]. 
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A virtualization environment generally consists of three core components: an hy- 
pervisor or Virtual Machine Manager (also VMM in the following), management tools, 
and Virtual Machines (VMs). In particular, the infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) Cloud 
layer directly leverages and exposes powerful virtualization technologies and resources 
to a remote user [3]. Nevertheless, virtualization technologies also introduce additional 
security concerns. The size of the attack surface for the virtualization approach is di- 
rectly proportional to the amount of emulated physical resource or functionality that 
must be provided in software. As regards containers, they can leverage all services of- 
fered by the host OS. The issue here is to enforce effective security and isolation among 
processes. This is actually more difficult to do, since OSes have not been designed with 
this in mind. Further, the partitioning/virtualization modes and ISAs 1 of recent CPU 
and GPU cannot be used by containers, as they are inherently part of virtualization and 
introduce the actual performance penalties of traditional VMs. Unikernels can be con- 
sidered an alternative to both containerization and virtualization. Their main strength 
lies in being more lightweight than virtualization and better isolated than containers. 
Nevertheless, unikernels introduce further issues such as manageability, monitoring, 
and reliability. 
In this paper, we survey various aspects of virtualization, analyze their impact on se- 
curity, and discuss future perspectives. In particular, we provide technology background 
for most widespread virtualization tools in order to highlight features, advantages, and 
potential security flaws, with a focus on their application to Cloud. Further, discussions 
and comparisons with containerization and unikernel approaches are introduced. 
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows: a technology background is pro- 
vided in Section 2; most relevant virtualization security issues are introduced in Section 
3; virtualization-based security approaches are presented in Section 4; novel enclave 
technology is discussed in Section 5; virtualization-based use cases, together with some 
future research trends, are presented in Section 6; and, finally, conclusions and hints for 
future work are given in Section 7. 
 
 
2 Technology Background 
 
Various different virtualization technologies are currently deployed in the Cloud, mostly 
for x86 64 architectures (e.g., Xen, KVM, VMware, VirtualBox, and HyperV). Most 
relevant details on virtualization frameworks and on supporting hardware (CPU/GPU) 
features are given and discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1 Virtualization Frameworks 
 
The essential characteristics of the most widespread virtualization environments are 
summarized in Table 1. It is worth noting that all present hypervisors support full vir- 
tualization (also hardware-assisted virtualization in the following), as it offers relevant 
performance and isolation benefits. In fact, hardware virtualization allows the CPU to 
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Fig. 1. Cloud layers and Virtualization 
 
 
detect and possibly block unauthorized or malicious access to virtual resources. Never- 
theless, no virtualization framework is immune to bugs. The virtualization platform can 
be an additional attack surface. 
 
2.2 CPU Virtualization 
 
The introduction of virtualization-enabling extensions in Intel and AMD CPUs dates 
back to 2005 [1, 25]. VT-x and AMD-V were developed to add an additional more 
privileged execution ring where an hypervisor or Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) 
could supervise actual access to physical resources from less privileged execution rings, 
as depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Table 1. CPU-related Virtualization Features 
 
X86 64 Hypervisor open source hypervisor type supported extension(s) 
Xen Y Native VT-x, AMD-V, EPT, RVI, VT-d, AMD-Vi 
KVM Y Hosted VT-x, AMD-V, EPT, RVI, VT-d, AMD-Vi 
VMWare ESX N Native VT-x, AMD-V, EPT, RVI, VT-d, AMD-Vi 
Hyper-V N Native VT-x, AMD-V, EPT, RVI, VT-d, AMD-Vi 
VirtualBox Y Hosted VT-x, AMD-V 
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CPUs are required to support some advanced extensions in order to allow the hy- 
pervisor to leverage them, as can be seen in Table 1. More in detail: 
– Intel VT-x AMD-V: These two CPU capability sets are the basic ingredients of 
hardware-supported virtualization. They introduce Ring -1 allowing a guest virtual 
machine to run its kernel at standard privilege level (i.e., Ring 0); 
– Intel EPT, AMD RVI: Rapid Virtualization Indexing and Extended Page Tables, 
i.e., the Support for Second Level Address Translation (SLAT) that can signifi- 
cantly improve performance; 
– Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi: These CPU capabilities (directed I/O) allow faster I/O re- 
source virtualization. 
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Fig. 2. Execution Rings for the x86 64 Architecture. See also [19] 
 
 
 
 
2.3 GPU Virtualization 
 
The virtualization paradigm also applies to Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). Vir- 
tual machines can be given mediated or full access to GPU computing and memory 
resources. This allows offering a GPU-based Cloud similar to what is already in place 
for CPU-based computing resource sharing. Hypervisor support for GPU virtualization 
features (see Table 2) is still somehow limited as relevant GPU technology is still re- 
served for high-end GPUs. In fact, GPU virtualization is usually implemented following 
one of these main approaches [24]: 
– time-sharing: a single VM at a time is given direct access to the GPU. Time-slots 
are handled by the hypervisor; 
– passthrough: the GPU is directly and permanently connected to a single VM that 
has direct access to it; 
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– partitioned: the GPU resources are split into smaller virtual GPUs, assigned to 
single VMs. 
Once VMs have access to the GPU, the interaction between the guest and the real 
resource can be achieved in two different ways: backend virtualization or frontend vir- 
tualization [17]. Backend virtualization gives a direct connection between the VM and 
the GPU hardware. Frontend virtualization poses an intermediate layer between the 
guest and the hardware that has to leverage some kind of intermediate APIs to access 
the GPU. Some frontend virtualization examples are gVirt [57], vCUDA [54], GViM 
[22] and VOCL [60]. 
 
Table 2. GPU-related Virtualization Features 
 
X86 64 Hypervisor open source supported GPU Virtualization Technologies 
Xen Y Intel GVT-g ,AMD MxGPU 
KVM Y Intel GVT-g ,AMD MxGPU 
VMWare ESX N Intel GVT-g ,AMD MxGPU 
Hyper-V N - 
Virtualbox Y - 
 
Particularly relevant here is AMD MxGPU technology [59], a partitioning strategy 
allowing users to have an equal share of the GPU. This hardware-based virtualization 
solution helps guaranteeing some isolation among different workloads and users. 
Intel GVT-g [57] is a full GPU virtualization solution with mediated passthrough 
(VFIO2 mediated device framework based). A virtual GPU instance is maintained for 
each VM, with part of performance critical resources directly assigned. The capabil- 
ity of running native graphics driver inside a VM, without hypervisor intervention in 
performance critical paths, achieves a good balance among performance, feature, and 
sharing capability. 
As GPUs are mainly used for computation tasks, security concerns about GPU vir- 
tualization are mainly focused on data leakage [16]. This can occur either by directly 
access data owned by the victim and stored within the GPU memory or by exploiting 
side channels. In [42], Christin et al. have depicted two adversary models: 
– serial adversary: this attacker has access to the victim’s GPU or GPU memory, 
before or after the victim. Hence, it can seek for traces/data previously left in 
different GPU memories; 
– parallel adversary: this attacker has contemporary access to the victim’s GPU. 
 
 
3 Virtualization Security Issues 
Virtualization technologies underlying Cloud computing infrastructure themselves con- 
stitute vulnerable surface. In a Cloud scenario, we can observe the following major 
security challenges [36]: 
 
 
2 Virtual Function I/O 
6 R. Di Pietro et al. 
 
 
– privileged user access: access to sensitive data in the Cloud has to be restricted to 
a subset of trusted users (to mitigate the risk of abuse of high privilege roles); 
– lack of data/computation isolation: one instance of customer data has to be fully 
isolated from data belonging to other customers; 
– reliability/availability: the Cloud provider has to setup an effective replication 
and recovery mechanism to restore services, should a security issue occur; 
 
Virtualization potentially widens Cloud computing attack vectors such as: 
– hypervisor: the hypervisor is the software element sitting in between the host and 
guests to allow mediated access to physical resources. This layer should be trans- 
parent to a non-privileged user running into the guest. Unfortunately, its presence 
cannot be fully hidden [47]. As such, an attacker can exploit hypervisor vulnera- 
bilities to gain access to both the host system and other guests. Hypervisors also 
provide emulation capabilities for missing hardware elements. However, this is a 
potential attack surface, as demonstrated by Ray [48] and Jason [26]; 
– pivoting: users can often login into specific services hosted by a VM. Once in- 
side, the attacker could also exit the virtual machine she accessed, to damage the 
underlying physical system and/or sibling VMs. 
– migration: virtual machines can be moved over different hosts for load balancing 
or disaster recovery. This “migration” is performed by copying the VM image over 
the network. An attacker can potentially eavesdrop data and perform a man in the 
middle attack if the channel is not encrypted. 
– resource allocation: virtual machines are usually executed on-demand at run-time, 
thus making the resource allocation and management process as dynamic as pos- 
sible. Resource sharing can thwart the security of the host system as well as of its 
virtual machines. In fact, negligence in cleaning resources before releasing them 
to others can lead to severe data leakage. As an example, data written by a VM 
into volatile or persistent storage can be accessed by others who have access to the 
same elements [51]; 
The above attacks show how virtual machines and the physical machines hosting 
them can be thwart by attackers targeting the host or just the virtual machine. Some 
mitigating approaches can be as follows: 
– host side: vulnerabilities in the implementation of the hypervisor can somewhat 
be mitigated by frequently updating the hypervisor to reduce 0-days vulnerability 
window; 
– network monitoring: monitoring and analyzing internal communications between 
sibling guests can help; nevertheless, malicious network behavior is difficult to 
detect by means of traditional intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention 
systems; 
– encryption: to mitigate such migration attacks, encryption of the data in transit 
can be used; nevertheless, this proves quite demanding on performance, and con- 
sequently on costs. 
– on allocation: this attack can be dealt with by carefully deleting/cleaning resources 
either persistent or volatile that have been previously assigned to other VMs; 
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3.1 Co-Location issues 
 
Co-location of virtual machines by different tenants on the same physical host is par- 
ticularly frequent in Cloud computing. Virtual resources assigned to a tenant might get 
hacked by other virtual resources assigned to different tenants that are co-located within 
the same physical machine. Co-location can lead to different issues as follows: 
– information leakage: by reusing the same physical hardware to allocate virtual 
resources, tenants might be able to exploit forensic tools to recover sensitive data 
from previous tenants; 
– performance degradation: malicious tenants co-located in the same physical host 
might be able to make an uneven/widely varying use of computational power with 
high cpu-intensive co-located virtual machines with the final goal of degrading 
victim’s performances; 
– service disruption: malicious tenants sharing physical resources with their victim 
might be able to lead the hardware to unexpected behaviors thus causing a service 
disruption against the victim. 
A large number of research results have highlighted the actual existence of co- 
location vulnerabilities [49, 62]. Such papers show that completely preventing tenants 
from sharing the same physical resources is practically unfeasible (due to rising costs). 
A viable solution [3] might be an attribute-based approach where tenants can express 
constraints over both virtual and physical resource allocation. Tenants would be able 
to indicate an high data sensitivity, thus requesting to avoid co-location. In this way, 
co-location will not be allowed for virtual resources working on high sensitive informa- 
tion thus lowering the chance of data leakage. As a consequence, virtual resource cost 
would be increased. This could be an acceptable trade-off in most sensitive scenarios. 
 
3.2 Randomness and Virtualization 
 
Cloud providers usually deploy identical VM clones when needed to satisfy request 
load. As such, it can happen that very similar (oftentimes the very same) images are 
(re)used for different tenants. As a consequence, the internal random pool for clone 
VMs is most probably the same/very similar for different VMs [20]. An adversary might 
exploit this weakness and try to guess the value of VM cryptographic keys [50]. In order 
to address such issue, the Cloud or Service providers should try to increase the number 
of events fed to the entropy pool of VM operating systems as soon as they are deployed, 
so as to provide an adequate level of security. 
 
3.3 Container Security 
 
The need for cost savings and shorter development cycles enabled the succes of contain- 
ers in the Cloud. Containers are lighter than virtual machines and provide near-native 
performance. Docker[18] is the current market leader, providing a fully-featured pack- 
aging tool. Nevertheless, as introduced above, Containers provide much less isolation 
to applications, as such mechanisms are not based on hardware features but on process 
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isolation approaches. Among other interesting works, Martin et al. [10] discuss Docker 
security real-world implications define an adversary model and describe several vulner- 
abilities affecting current Docker usage. The very same authors [41] detail Docker vul- 
nerabilities and identify several vulnerabilities present by design or introduced by some 
original use-cases. Albeit some practical countermeasures are proposed, it is clear the 
containerization approach cannot guarantee an adequate level of security and protection 
in many multi-tenant scenarios. 
 
3.4 Unikernel Security 
The container limitation in providing actual isolation can be addressed by Unikernels, 
leveraging hardware virtualization to provide a potentially better alternative to contain- 
ers (at least from the security point of view). Unikernels are specialized lightweight 
virtual machines (VMs) that squeeze the guest operating system and userspace layers 
together into one single VM layer [39]. This provides a smaller footprint, and a min- 
imal attack surface. However, managing the privileges of thousands of unikernels is 
often difficult and error prone. An interesting approach is proposed in VirtusCap [53], 
a multi-layer access control architecture and mechanism leveraging unikernels. Virtus- 
Cap limits privileges of unikernels using the Principle of Least Privilege. This allowd 
creating unikernels that have only the privileges they need to accomplish their task. 
 
3.5 Virtualization and Spectre/Meltdown 
Spectre [31] and Meltdown [35] are recently discovered CPU vulnerabilities stem- 
ming from hardware-implemented performance optimizations aimed at reducing CPU- 
memory access latencies. Spectre leverages the fact that the speculative execution re- 
sulting from a branch misprediction can leave observable side effects that may reveal 
private data to attackers. In fact, when the memory access pattern depends on private 
data, the resulting state of the data cache constitutes a side channel an attacker can 
leverage to extract information about the private data. 
Meltdown allows a userspace process to read all memory, even beyond its access 
scope. Like Spectre, the problem lies with speculative machine code execution that 
allows cache-timing attacks to leak data from all the memory. 
Both Spectre and Meltdown are serious security vulnerabilities, in particular since 
they have been proven to even bypass CPU isolation features guaranteed by hardware- 
assisted virtualization. The reason why is that they are tied to hard-coded CPU opti- 
mizations that involve reusing (i.e. not deleting) cached values even though they belong 
to different (even security) contexts. Nevertheless, Containers and Unikernels are also 
vulnerable. As such, mitigating such hardware/firmware bugs is mandatory for any kind 
of co-location and multi-tenancy of the same physical CPU. 
 
 
4 Virtualization Benefits for Security 
Virtualization technologies also constitute a privileged point of view for observing and 
tracing VM activity. This can be used to collect useful data, analyze them, and act 
accordingly. 
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4.1 Virtual Machine Monitoring 
 
A core set of requirements that a security monitoring system for the Cloud should meet 
can be summarized as follows [36]: 
– effectiveness: the system should be able to detect attacks and integrity violations. 
– accuracy: the system should be able to avoid false-positives, i.e., mistakenly de- 
tecting malware attacks where authorized activities are taking place. 
– transparency: the system should minimize detectability from inside guests, i.e., 
potential intruders should not be able to detect the presence of the monitoring 
system. 
– robustness: the host system, Cloud infrastructure and the sibling VMs should be 
protected from attacks proceeding from a compromised guest and it should not be 
possible to disable or alter the monitoring system itself. 
– reactivity: the system should either be able to take action against both the attempt 
and the compromised guest, or notify other security-management components. 
– accountability: the system should not interfere with Cloud and Cloud application 
actions, but collect data and snapshots to enforce accountability policies. 
 
Nevertheless, satisfying these requirements is quite difficult, as there is a clear trade- 
off between transparency and reactivity. Possible mitigation approaches include: 
– hiding reaction: i.e., leveraging regular guest maintenance actions as a reaction. 
E.g., halting the guest, restarting a fresh image, migrating the VM instance. 
– delaying reaction: snapshotting the current status and delaying performing reac- 
tive activity. Nevertheless, the adversary might be able to perform further activity 
before being stopped. 
In fact, a viable approach to achieve integrity protection is to continuously monitor 
key components that would most probably be targeted by attacks. We have shown (see 
also [36]) that by either actively or passively monitoring kernel or middleware com- 
ponents, it is actually possible to detect modifications to kernel data and code, thus 
guaranteeing that kernel and middleware integrity have not been compromised. A fully 
asynchronous monitoring system can be a viable solution [15] to provide protection 
and advanced transparent introspection capabilities to an hypervisor, as detailed in the 
following. 
 
4.2 Semantic Introspection and Modeling VM Behavior 
 
Monitoring key Cloud components that would be targeted or affected by attacks is vital 
in order to protect the VMs and the Cloud infrastructure [2]. By either actively or pas- 
sively monitoring key VM components any possible modification to VM data and code 
can be traced and recorded. 
In fact, virtual machine introspection is a process that allows observing the state of 
a VM from outside of it. Syringe [7] is one example of a monitoring system making use 
of virtualization to observe and monitor guest kernel code integrity from a privileged 
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Fig. 3. Virtualization: Introspection Components 
 
 
VM or from the VMM. However, it is quite simple for guest code to realize it is running 
inside a VM that can potentially be a honeypot VM [34]. 
The approach depicted in Fig. 3 is an example of advanced transparent passive trac- 
ing and recording of VM events from the hypervisor [36]. Any relevant event or status 
change is recorded by an event interceptor and it is then stored in a pool of recorder 
warnings where the collected information is asynchronously evaluated (evaluator) and, 
if needed, a reaction is triggered (act) according to a chosen policy. 
An interesting VM-introspection-based approach is CloRExPa [15], providing vari- 
ous kinds of customizable resilience service solutions for Cloud guests, using execution 
path analysis. CloRExPa can trace, analyze and control live VM activity, and intervened 
code and data modifications, possibly due to either malicious attacks or software faults. 
Execution path analysis allows the VMM to trace the VM state and to prevent such a 
guest from reaching faulty states, leveraging scenario graphs. 
This trend towards semantic introspection of VM activity is a very active field also 
as regards mobile devices in the Cloud [27]. This is the way to go for enabling control 
over possibly untrusted mobile Cloud nodes/applications. In fact, as will be detailed in 
the following for Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) untrusted devices, either they have 
to be banned altogether from the enterprise or enhanced semantics-aware introspection 
has to be put in place to prevent them from leaking sensitive information. Outside of 
the enterprise, semantic introspection allows legitimate users to regain control over their 
device internals. This approach will help detect and react to malware and to backdoors 
that are put in place even by trusted software or apps. 
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The main problem with introspection is that it requires knowing the internals and se- 
mantics of guest operating systems and running applications. This is especially difficult 
in case of closed-source OS and application such as in Windows and Mac environments. 
In fact, Windows OSes have always been the main target of malware that have exploited 
numerous bugs and vulnerabilities exposed by its implementations [37]. Recent trusted 
boot technology plus additional integrity checks have rendered the Windows OS less 
vulnerable to kernel-level rootkits [30]. Nevertheless, guest Windows Virtual Machines 
are becoming an increasingly interesting attack target. HyBIS [14] is the only exam- 
ple of introspection system protecting present Windows OS Guests from malware and 
rootkits. 
 
4.3 Finer-Grained Security 
Some other approaches are available that can enhance a general advanced protection 
system or be considered as a standalone solution. 
As an example, Cloudvisor [61] is a transparent, backward-compatible approach 
protecting the privacy and integrity of cloud VMs. Cloudvisor separates the resource 
management from security protection in the virtualization layer. A small security mon- 
itor hidden under the VMM and leveraging nested virtualization [56] is used to protect 
the VMM and VMs. This approach is claimed of not affecting the security of users data 
inside the VMs. 
In NestCloud [45] nested virtualization can be used in several usage models such 
as debugging and live migration. NestCloud is a three-level nested virtualization archi- 
tecture minimizing the overhead caused by the additional level. NestCloud is a very 
effective approach for detailed introspection of VMs at the cost of increased latency 
and reduced performance. 
Albeit not directly applied to cloud computing, Payer and Gross [46] presented an 
interesting work on virtualization for safe execution of applications based on software- 
based fault isolation and policy-based system call authorization. A running application 
is encapsulated in an additional layer of protection using dynamic binary translation in 
user-space. This virtualization layer dynamically recompiles the machine code and adds 
multiple dynamic security guards that verify the running code to protect and contain the 
application. The binary translation system implemented in [46] redirects all system calls 
to a policy-based system call authorization framework. This interposition framework 
validates every system call based on the given arguments and the location of the system 
call. Depending on the user-loadable policy and an extensible handler mechanism the 
framework decides whether a system call is allowed, rejected, or redirect to a specific 
user-space handler in the virtualization layer. 
Also Lee et al. [32] discuss how new hardware architectural features for cloud 
servers can help protect the confidentiality and integrity of a cloud customer’s code and 
data in leased Virtual Machines, even when the powerful underlying hypervisor may 
be compromised. They use a non-bypassable form of hardware access control leverag- 
ing the hardware trend towards manycore chips and hardware virtualization features to 
enhance Cloud Security. They aim at exploring software-hardware co-design for secu- 
rity to design future trustworthy systems that provide security protections, at the levels 
needed, when needed, even when malware is in the system. 
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Another interesting work is by Cazalas et al. [8]. They study whether integrity of ex- 
ecution can be preserved for process-level virtualization protection schemes in the face 
of adversarial analysis. Their approach considers exploits that target the virtual execu- 
tion environment itself and how it interacts with the underlying host operating system 
and hardware. Results indicate that such protection mechanisms may be vulnerable at 
the level where the virtualized code interacts with the underlying operating system, 
undermining security and calling for additional mitigation techniques using hardware- 
based integration or hybrid virtualization techniques that can better defend legitimate 
uses of virtualized software protection. 
 
 
5 Secure Enclaves and Virtualization 
In Cloud computing environments, hardware resources are shared, and parallel com- 
putation widespread that can produce privacy and security issues when isolation is not 
enforced. In fact, the hypervisor is an important cornerstone of Cloud computing that 
is not necessarily trustworthy or bug-free. To mitigate this threat Intel and AMD in- 
troduced respectively SGX 3 [9] and SEV 4 [29], which transparently encrypt a vir- 
tual machines memory. Intel introduced the SGX [11] hardware extensions to create a 
trusted execution environment (secure enclave or isolation container) within its CPUs. 
SGX claims runtime protection of a running process/VM even if the host OS and soft- 
ware components are malicious. Isolation containers are a primitive to minimize trusted 
software, leveraging trusted hardware and having a small performance overhead [11]. 
This is a smart idea though present implementations (AMD SEV and Intel SGX) do 
still have some limitations, as we detail in the following. 
 
5.1 Intel SGX 
 
Intel SGX [55] is an hardware technology aimed at protecting guest code and data 
from the hypervisor. It is an architecture extension designed to increase the security of 
software through an “inverse sandbox” mechanism. Legitimate software can be sealed 
inside an “enclave” and protected from unauthorized access, even when malware has 
hypervisor privileges. SGX was designed to comply with some clear requirements/ob- 
jectives [9]: 
– protecting sensitive data from unauthorized access or modification by rogue soft- 
ware running at higher privilege levels; 
– supporting legitimate software allowing them to continue using platform re- 
sources; 
– maintaining consumer freedom allowing them to retain control of their platforms 
and the freedom to install and uninstall applications and services as they choose; 
– allow certifying an applications trusted code and produce a signed attestation, 
rooted in the processor, that includes this measurement and other certification that 
the code has been correctly initialized in a trustable environment; 
 
 
3 Software Guard Extensions 
4 Secure Encrypted Virtualization 
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– supporting legacy (development) tools, processes, and software distribution chan- 
nels; 
– allowing scalability of the performance of trusted applications in order to scale 
with the capabilities of the underlying hardware; 
– protecting applications allowing them to define secure regions of code and data 
that maintain confidentiality even when an attacker has physical control of the 
platform and can conduct direct attacks on memory. 
SGX minimizes the amount of code that provides support for the protected-module 
architecture, whereas module state persistence is delegated to the untrusted operating 
system. Nevertheless, state continuity must be guaranteed since an attacker should not 
be able to cause a module to use stale states (i.e. a rollback attack), and while the 
system is not under attack, a module should always be able to make progress, even 
when the system could crash or lose power at unexpected random points in time [55]. 
Providing state-continuity support is non-trivial as many algorithms are vulnerable to 
attack, require on-chip non-volatile memory, wear-out existing off-chip secure non- 
volatile memory and/or are too slow for many applications. ICE [55] is an interesting 
architecture providing state-continuity guarantees to protected modules by means of a 
machine-checked proof. ICE does not rely on secure non-volatile storage for every state 
update (e.g., the slow TPM chip) and is resilient to power losses. 
 
5.2 SGX Security Issues 
 
Albeit beneficial and promising in theory, the SGX approach has proven vulnerable to 
(mostly side-channel) attacks from its early days. As an example, CacheZoom [44] can 
track all memory accesses of SGX enclaves with high spatial and temporal precision. 
Further, AES key recovery attacks have been proven possible on SGX enclaves. 
Hertzelt et al. [23] analyse to what extent the proposed features can resist a ma- 
licious hypervisor and discuss the tradeoffs imposed by additional protection mecha- 
nisms. They developed a model of SEV’s security capabilities and found three design 
shortcomings. Firstly, the virtual machine control block is not encrypted and handled 
directly by the hypervisor, allowing it to bypass VM memory encryption by execut- 
ing conveniently chosen gadgets. Secondly, the general purpose registers are not en- 
crypted upon vmexit, leaking potentially sensitive data. Finally, the control over the 
nested pagetables allows a malicious hypervisor to closely monitor the execution state 
of a VM and attack it with memory replay attacks. 
Schwarts et al [52] have found that SGX can be used to Conceal Cache Attacks. 
They demonstrate software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave 
targeting co-located enclaves, and abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself. 
The attack is fully functional even across multiple Docker containers. In fact the real 
issue with cache attacks lies with stealing information (such as private keys) rather that 
controlling a system. 
Cloak [21] is another technique leveraging hardware transactional memory to pre- 
vent adversarial observation of cache misses on sensitive code and data. Cloak provides 
protection against cache-based side-channel attacks for SGX enclaves. 
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Constan’s Sanctum [12] achieves stronger security guarantees under software at- 
tacks than SGX with an equivalent programming model. In fact, Sanctum offers the 
same promise as Intels Software Guard Extensions (SGX), namely strong provable iso- 
lation of software modules running concurrently and sharing resources, but protects 
against an important class of additional software attacks that infer private information 
from a programs memory access patterns. Sanctum reduces attack surface through iso- 
lation, rather than plugging attack-specific privacy leaks. Most of Sanctums logic is 
implemented in trusted software, which does not perform cryptographic operations us- 
ing keys, and is easier to analyze than SGXs opaque microcode. Sanctum prototype 
leverages a RISC-V [58] core but is quite flexible in that it adds hardware at the in- 
terfaces between generic building blocks, replacing SGXs microcode with a software 
security monitor that runs at a higher privilege level than the hypervisor and the OS. On 
RISC-V, the security monitor runs at machine level, leveraging one privileged enclave, 
similarly to SGXs Quoting Enclave. The really interesting idea behind Sanctum is that 
it leverages a principled, transparent, and well-scrutinized approach to secure system 
design. 
SGX may be vulnerable to other side channel attacks, such as cache access pattern 
monitoring (see also [5] by Brasser et al.). In fact, [5] proves that cache-based attacks 
are a serious threat to the confidentiality of SGX-protected programs by showing an at- 
tack without interrupting enclave execution. Brasser et al. also stress their approach has 
major technical challenges, since the existing cache monitoring techniques experience 
significant noise when the victim process is not interrupted. 
The SGX-based branch shadowing attack is described in [33] which can reveal fine- 
grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running on real SGX 
hardware. In fact, SGX does not clear the branch history when switching from enclave 
mode to non-enclave mode, leaving the fine-grained traces to the outside world through 
a branch-prediction side channel. They developed two exploitation techniques: Intel PT- 
and LBR-based history-inferring techniques and APIC-based technique to control the 
execution of enclave programs in a fine-grained manner. As a result, their attack could 
brake ORAM, Sanctum, SGX-Shield, and T-SGX. A software-based countermeasure, 
called Zigzagger, was introduced by [33] to mitigate the branch shadowing attack in 
practice. 
Brasser et al. [4] propose a data location randomization as a novel defensive ap- 
proach against side-channel attacks. Their compiler-based tool called DR.SGX instru- 
ments enclave code to permute data locations at the granularity of cache lines. Brasser’s 
solution protects most, but not all enclaves from typical SGX cache attacks. 
 
 
6 Use Cases for Virtualization 
This section introduces increasingly common Use Cases and Technological scenarios. 
One relevant topic is mobile virtualization for small devices such as smartphones, smart 
watches, and tablets, that are carried everywhere. They are referred to as Bring Your 
Own Device (BYOD) since their owner usually carries them even inside the secure 
perimeter of companies and, in general, at work. This section also highlights the usage 
of virtualization honeypots for malware collection and computer forensics purposes. In 
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fact, malware can be analyzed and dissected based on the interaction with the emulated 
virtual environment. 
 
6.1 BYOD and Virtualization 
 
Personal mobile devices often enter enterprise boundaries. They can potentially hide 
malware or eavesdrop sensitive data to the outside world. At present, there is little or 
no control over an enterprise personnel mobile device data and application content and 
integrity. Banning such devices altogether from within enterprise boundaries does not 
seem a viable approach. A better one would imply remote attestation of the integrity 
and compliance of the employees mobile device to the desired security policies. Secure 
virtualization mechanisms based on a trusted transparent monitoring hypervisor would 
help. In fact, software integrity attestation future perspectives are good, given that ARM 
CPUs increasingly support virtualization extensions that allow implementing hypervi- 
sors that can run and monitor trusted VMs even on mobile/handheld devices [13]. The 
hypervisor would be able to enforce the exclusive execution of an enterprise VM when 
the device is inside well defined boundaries. The same VM can be disabled outside such 
boundaries in order to limit/prevent data breaches. 
 
6.2 Virtualization and Smartphones 
 
Increasingly often, smart mobile phones are relevant sources of information for inves- 
tigations. Most currently available tools able to acquire forensic evidence from smart- 
phones require destructive physical access to the device. This is one use case where 
secure virtualization can be used to access live data without interfering with regular 
phone activity and thus allowing live mobile forensics. LiveSD Forensics [6] is an ex- 
ample of on-device live data acquisition of the RAM and the EEPROM of Windows 
mobile devices. LiveSD Forensics uses a standard SD-card equipped with tailored code 
to perform the data acquisition. Unfortunately, LiveSD generates a memory alteration, 
albeit small. 
In addition, virtualization allows creating mobile honeypots able to study and clas- 
sify malware in a controlled way. In fact, similarly to mobile forensics, mobile virtual- 
ization can be used to collect malware and study its behavior, in a mostly transparent 
way. As mobile hardware is increasingly capable of running multiple VMs in parallel, 
different levels of security can be associated to different VMs to limit malware activity. 
 
6.3 Future Research Directions 
 
Future virtualization trends are mostly related to novel technological developments that 
aim at better isolation and performance. One such example is represented by ARM 
CPUs that, apart from being dominant in the mobile market, are increasingly present in 
the server arena. A second example is represented by Cloud-provided GPU access that 
is increasingly common. Finally, novel x86 64 processors integrate both CPU and GPU 
cores. Nevertheless, they have to provide additional security guarantees. Efficiently vir- 
tualizing distributed heterogeneous computing in the Cloud is an opportunity to improve 
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Cloud security and reliability. Further, in order to allow efficient secure usage of mul- 
ticores, such resources have to be constantly monitored for anomalous usage patterns, 
since sharing resources also introduces additional security and privacy issues. Finally, 
the availability of an increasingly large amount of computing cores allows using them 
for a number of novel applications, such as computation replication for reliability and 
availability or proactive computing for most different possible scenarios. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Virtualization is at the heart of Cloud computing. Albeit more lightweight approaches 
such as Containerization and Unikernels exist, hardware-supported isolation mecha- 
nisms provide beneficial in many different scenarios where security requirements are 
relevant. Nevertheless, security vulnerabilities are still a major issue, as highlighted by 
recently discovered exploits. Enhanced virtualization approaches and more effective 
isolation and monitoring technologies, that can also leverage additional computing re- 
sources of recent CPUs and GPUs, are still in their infancy. Such advances, coupled 
with appropriate software counterparts, will possibly improve the integrity and security 
of resources in Cloud, server farms, and in mobile scenarios. 
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